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ABSTRACT
AMY C. CAIN: Education in Liberal Political Theories
(Under the direction of Dr. Robert Westmoreland)

This paper examines two sources of conflict within the literature on education in
liberal political theories: the proper justifications for a state-mandated education and the
necessary standard for education in a liberal state. After arguing that a liberal state must
offer a child-centered justification for the universal mandate and uphold an equality
standard of education, this paper proceeds to examine two common objections to such a
system of compulsory education in a liberal state. This paper concludes that the perennial
objections based upon concerns for familial rights and pluralism do not present a
significant obstacle for incorporating a system of compulsory education in a liberal state.
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INTRODUCTION
The origin of liberal political theories is traceable to a desire for social
stability through tolerance of irreconcilable beliefs. These ideas eventually evolved
into a family of theories addressing the relationship of liberty and the state which we
now know as liberal political theories. Primarily, early calls for tolerance proposed an
agreement of nonviolence between different religious sects. More than advocating
complete acceptance of all religions, early proponents encouraged a modus vivendi in
which different groups would compromise to reach an agreement on fundamental
principles and tolerate differences in peripheral beliefs.1 These agreements, although
originally intended to protect the stability of the state from the people, eventually
promoted a line of thought in which liberty of conscience was justified independently
of its role in social stability as an individual right which must be protected from the
state.
Many influential, contemporary defenses of liberty of conscience expand
beyond the freedom necessary for achieving collective goals like social stability and
protect individuals’ liberty from state intervention.2 Many modern liberal theories
prioritize the liberty of individuals and propose a state which preserves the conditions
under which this liberty can be exercised. Gaus, Courtland, and Schmidtz characterize

1

Henry Kamen, The Rise of Toleration, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967): 69.
Whether it is necessary for a liberal theorist to protect a scheme of liberties as opposed to a complete
concept of liberty remains incredibly controversial, especially as a point of difference between classical and
new liberals. This paper will treat theories protecting either a unified concept or a scheme of liberty as
liberal.
2
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liberal theories as guided by a form of the “fundamental liberal principle” which
claims that because humans were in a state of total freedom before the emergence of
the state, limitations of this freedom by the state must be justified.3 Prior to the advent
of the state, people were free to develop and pursue their own conceptions of the
good. This “total freedom” includes complete liberty to form and pursue this
conception independent of anyone else’s consent.4 As such, “[L]iberals accord liberty
primacy as a political value.”5 Thus, the burden of proof lies with the state to justify
any departures from complete liberty.
While liberals may be able to rally around the defense of liberty, refining this
concept of liberty and its justification remains a contentious issue in the literature.
Conceptions of liberty are distinguishable within two families: negative liberty and
positive liberty.6 Classical liberals, as well as many libertarian theorists, propose and
defend a conception of negative liberty: liberty as the absence of external humancaused barriers and constraints on one’s action.7 Perhaps the most influential liberty
principle of this kind is that of John Stuart Mill which reads, “The only freedom
which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as
we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it.”8 For

Gerald Gaus, Shane D. Courtland, and David Schmidtz, “Liberalism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Stanford University, January 22, 2018,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/liberalism/.
4
Gaus, Courtland, and Schmidtz.
5
Gaus, Courtland, and Schmidtz.
6
Some theorist, including Gerald MacCallum, deny a clear distinction between conceptions of negative and
positive liberty; however, for the purposes of this paper, these differences relevant and will be treated as
substantial. More information on this debate can be found in Ian Carter’s "Positive and Negative Liberty."
7
Ian Carter, "Positive and Negative Liberty," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N.
Zalta, 2019. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/liberty-positive-negative/.
8
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978), 12.
3
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Mill, a person’s potential to live an autonomous life in pursuit of his/her perception of
the good requires limits on state power.
“Right” liberals in this negative liberty tradition, such as the libertarian
theorist Robert Nozick, defend liberty as primarily a right to non-interference by the
state.9 Nozick describes his position as “rights as side constraints” which argues that
“[t]he rights of others determine the constraints upon your actions.”10 As a
consequence of his dedication to liberty as non-interference, Nozick’s conception of
rights as side constraints limits the role and authority of the state to the prevention
and punishment of rights violations. Nozick maintains that this conception limits the
goals which a state may pursue to those which do not violate individuals’ liberty.11
Even if social policies such as the redistribution of wealth would minimize overall
rights violations, such policies cannot be pursued if even one person’s liberty is
abridged.12 Although Nozick’s theory offers an extreme example of this conception of
negative liberty, classical liberals stress this idea of liberty as non-interference even
while defending a larger role for the state.
“New” liberals conceive of liberty in the positive sense as not merely a right
to non-interference, but also as a realized capacity to frame and pursue a conception
of the good.13 These “left” liberals, as typified by John Rawls, attempt to preserve a
“fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties”14 which allows a
substantially more active role of the state and is consistent with substantial

9

Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 30.
Nozick, 29.
11
Nozick, 29.
12
Nozick, 158-159.
13
Ian Carter, "Positive and Negative Liberty."
14
John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 5.
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restrictions of liberty. Later, Rawls defends liberalism as necessary for a society of
fair cooperation amongst equal citizens.15 Justice provides citizens with equal rights
within society due to individuals’ two moral powers – the potentialities to form a
conception of the good and to give justice to others – and their powers of reason.16
In each of these conceptions of liberalism, those which advocate negative
liberty and those which defend positive liberty, the central justification is found on
the individual level: the liberty of each person limits the power of the state. Thus, the
permissibility or impermissibility of policies in a liberal state must be judged on this
individualistic basis.
In order to preserve the liberty of individuals to develop and pursue their own
conceptions of the good, liberal theorists – in both the positive and negative liberty
traditions – propose a neutral state. Liberal theories defend a state that is neutral in
regard to differing conceptions of the good, yet the justification for this neutrality
differs for political liberal theories and comprehensive political theories. Although
neither sect of liberalism claims to be entirely amoral, a “political” liberal theory, as
the later Rawls understands the term, proposes political principles which avoid
appealing to any comprehensive conceptions of the good.17 Political principles can be
agreed upon by all reasonable persons in society, regardless of their personal
conceptions of the good.18 These neutral principles form the moral content of the
liberal state.19

15

Rawls, 15.
Rawls, 19.
17
Charles Larmore, "Political Liberalism," Political Theory 18, no. 3 (1990): 341.
18
Larmore, 341.
19
Larmore, 341.
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In contrast to this family of liberal theories, comprehensive theories, such as
those liberal theories proposed by Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, justify
neutrality with appeals to controversial conceptions of the good, both of which are
enveloped in the term “individualism.”20 As Charles Larmore explains, “By
remaining neutral with regard to controversial view of the good life, constitutional
principles will express, according to them [Kant and Mill], what ought to be of
supreme value throughout the whole of our life.”21 Larmore continues, “Their view
was that the individualist value of self-development offers the best justification of the
principle that the state should not promote one controversial view of the good life at
the expense of others.”22 In order to support the claim that the state must remain
neutral, comprehensive theories rely on contestable ideas of the good.23 Thus,
comprehensive liberalism’s attempts to preserve state neutrality violate the very
liberal ideals which it purports to uphold. Larmore describes political liberalism as
positioned between the extremes of a controversial comprehensive liberalism and the
purely pragmatic modus vivendi.24 This idea of political liberalism will be the ideal of
neutrality against which liberal proposals will be measured in this paper.
Within a neutral state, liberal theories recognize the liberty of individuals to
pursue their own conception of the good and, as such, reject highly paternalistic
intervention by the state which attempts to promote or discourage certain conceptions
of the good. This anti-paternalism is a consequence of liberal theorists’ acceptance of

20

Larmore, 343.
Larmore 342-343.
22
Larmore, 343.
23
Larmore, 343.
24
Larmore, 346.
21
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irreducible pluralism: in a society in which people exercise their liberty in forming a
conception of the good, there will be more than one fully reasonable conception of
the good. In discussing the good as manifest in plans of life, John Rawls argues,
“Since plans which it is rational to adopt vary from person to person depending upon
their endowments and circumstances, and the like, different individuals find their
happiness in doing different things.”25 This multiplicity of conceptions of the good is
not the result of some people’s ineffective exercise of liberty. Rather, as Charles
Larmore explains, “Reasonableness, by which I mean thinking and conversing in
good faith and applying, as best as one can, the general capacities of reason which
belong to every domain of inquiry, has ceased to seem a guarantee of unanimity.”26
Thus, even equally cautious stewards of liberty and reason will arrive at various
conceptions of the good. Liberals reject a paternalistic state because the state’s
imposition of its own conception of the good precludes individuals’ liberty to
discover and pursue their own idea of the good. However, children present a unique
challenge to this idea.
With this essential background, I turn to the core of my thesis: justifications
and standards for education in a liberal state. Children have not yet formed their own
conceptions of the good, so their potential to form these conceptions must be
protected from indoctrination by both parents and the state. Stephen Macedo
expresses this liberal concern in saying, “Indoctrination is antieducational whether it
is undertaken by the government or by parents and churches.”27 This is motivated by

25

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999): 359.
Larmore, "Political Liberalism," 340.
27
Stephen Macedo. "Crafting Good Citizens." Education Next 4, no. 2 (2004): 15.
26
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the requirement of justice that their future choices and lifestyles be truly their own,
including a right of exit from communities in which one was raised. Yet, in order to
preserve the liberty of individuals in future society, each generation must retain a
certain amount of knowledge and ability to continue the liberal state. Even when
conceived in the minimalist form of negative liberty, citizens of a liberal state must be
informed of their own rights which they may choose to exercise and the rights of
others which they may not violate. These concerns for the liberty of children and
stability of the liberal state, either individually or jointly, propel most liberal theists to
incorporate universal state-mandated education into their theories.
This recognition of the necessity of universal education branches into other
areas of disagreement. Among such queries are these: who is responsible for funding
education, who should provide the physical schools where this education will occur,
what ideas can be taught in schools, what ideas must be taught in schools, and who
has the final say in designing a student’s academic journey. Although discourse on
educational theory rightfully includes considerations of both formal and informal
institutions, this paper is primarily concerned with examining the questions related to
the system of formal institutions in which children are educated from elementary
grades through high school.28
The first two sections of this paper critically examine two conflicts within
educational theories on the liberal spectrum. Part I examines the differing justification
for universal education in liberal political theories and explains these arguments as
separable into groups which utilize society-sustaining justifications and those which

28

For a discussion of this distinction see Alan Ryan’s "J.S. Mill on Education" page 657.
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are individualistic and child-centered. This section argues that for an education
system to be consistent with a liberal political theory, its justification must be
individual and focused on the liberty and potential liberty of children. Part II
examines a further division between liberal political theories which present arguments
for an adequate level of universal education and those which argue for equality of
education. After examining the discourse in this literature, I argue that equality of
education is most consistent with liberal ideals.
Having considered these divisions within discussions of education in liberal
political theories, Parts III and IV examine and answer two perennial objections to
mandating any level whatsoever of education in a liberal political system. Part III
analyzes the objection that universal education violates parental rights and
undermines the value of the family. Part IV confronts the concern that state-mandated
education minimizes pluralism in a way that is inherently illiberal and argues that
pluralism, while constrained by universal education, is constrained only for liberty’s
sake. Thus, this limitation meets the requirements of liberalism.
The ultimate section of this paper synthesizes the results of this analysis and
concludes that further work is needed to explore the implications of these arguments
for liberal theories not explored in this paper. In particular, Harry Brighouse’s work
passes the liberal standards proposed in this work and would benefit from an analysis
of the specific challenges to his book School Choice and Social Justice.
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PART I: SOCIETAL VS. INDIVIDUAL JUSTIFICATIONS
Education plays a foundational role in weaving together generations of
citizens into a common culture. As the famous educational reformer, John Dewey,
observed, society is dependent upon its ability to pass information to future
generations. He explains, “Education, in its broadest sense, is the means of this social
continuity of life.”29 Education provides a societal good in preparing children for their
future roles in common life.30 While this would perhaps be easily achievable through
an indoctrination of productive attitudes and beliefs, liberals are particularly
concerned with the deleterious effects this will have on students’ liberty.
Accordingly, liberals attempt to avoid Foucault’s conception of the modern
school system. From Foucault’s perspective, educational institutions are merely a
means by which society exercises power/knowledge to “maximize efficiency” and
“neutralize dangers.”31 This approach, while sustaining a stable society, incorporates
indoctrination practices that fail to treat children as individuals who will develop and
pursue their own conceptions of the good. As Mill cautions, “…a State which dwarfs
its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for
beneficial purposes – will find that with small men no great thing can really be
accomplished.”32 From Mill’s view, education is about presenting options to students,

John Dewey, “Democracy and Education (1916),” Middle Works Bd 9 (1966): 2.
Dewey, 6.
31
James D. Marshall, “Foucault and Education,” Australian Journal of Education 33, no. 2 (1989): 108.
32
Mill, On Liberty, 113.
29
30
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not mandating belief.33 In crafting their educational systems, liberal theorists must
balance a desire to perpetuate a liberal state with the desire to preserve the liberty and
future liberty of students.
In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argues that “to bring a child into existence
without a fair prospect of being able, not only to provide good for its body, but
instruction for its mind is a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and
against society.”34 Mill views universal education as both providing the public good
of self-sufficient citizens and conferring individual goods in the form of “exalting and
dignifying our nature.”35 This two-pronged justification for state-mandated education
– preventing harm to society and injustice to the child – spawned two often
competing schools of thought in liberal political theory. Although I argue that it is
productive to divide the literature along the lines of societal and individual
justifications, it is important to note that these justifications are not mutually
exclusive in every theory. Theorists who offer forms of both justifications are noted
even as their arguments are divided for separate analysis. This analysis begins by
analyzing justifications for state-mandated education which rest upon a concept for
maintaining a continuity of the liberal state.
Stephen Macedo in “Liberal Civic Education and Its Limits,” argues for
universal education on the basis that “peaceful, orderly, tolerant liberal diversity
needs to be planned for.”36 According to Macedo, common schools (physical

33

Graham Finlay, "Mill on Education and Schooling," A Companion to Mill (2016): 509.
Mill, On Liberty, 104.
35
Finlay, "Mill on Education," 504.
36
Stephen Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education and Its Limits," Canadian Journal of Education/Revue
canadienne de l'éducation 20, no. 3 (1995): 304 (original emphasis).
34
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communal spaces in which classes are held) may be a matter of debate, but a basic
level of common education is necessary in a political liberal system to ensure shared
civic virtues.37 In particular Macedo sees education as fulfilling the responsibility of
teaching students civil respect which he describes not as a skepticism about the truth
of one’s own beliefs, but as an understanding between equal citizens that some views
are irreconcilable.38 Because of the permanence of reasonable pluralism, citizens in a
liberal state must be taught how to view their fellow citizens as deserving of equal
respect in the political sphere even in the presence of disagreement about
comprehensive conceptions of the good.39 As civil respect is essential for citizens to
cooperate and continue the liberal state, the state must mandate an education which
includes the teaching of this value. Thus, the system is ultimately justified in terms of
the good which it provides the state.
In "Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education,"
William Galston contends that because a basic level of knowledge is required to make
reasoned decisions, the democratic state has an interest in maintaining this level of
knowledge through mandated education.40 Galston asserts that no normative
judgment is required to recognize that a democracy cannot survive without citizens’
civic engagement.41 This seems to be true by definition. If a democracy is a
government whose decisions are made by the people, then an absence of people’s
participation would equate to the absence of a democracy. Nevertheless, a moral

37

Macedo, 304.
Macedo, 308.
39
Macedo, 307-308.
40
William A. Galston, "Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education," Annual Review
of Political Science 4, no. 1 (2001): 218.
41
Galston, 220.
38
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judgment is required to make this need to sustain democracy the basis for a statemandated education in a liberal political system. In defense of this judgment, Galston
merely prompts the reader to remember that education for citizenship was one of the
primary reasons that the American public-school system was created.42 However, this
historical fact does not provide a solid basis for this judgment as faulty reasons are
not grandfathered into justice merely because of their antiquity. A full argument for
this democracy-sustaining justification is noticeably lacking in the article.
Callan builds upon the state-sustaining justifications defended by Macedo and
Galston and takes them a step further by arguing that a liberal education system
should actively instill the virtues of democratic liberalism. This expectation goes well
beyond the requirements of a political process and instead promotes a liberal social
society as well. He says that “a civic education worth its name will steel the spirit
against the pull of liberal democratic heresy – it will be antiracist and
antidiscriminatory, among other things.”43 This requirement marks a departure from
liberalism restrained to the political sphere and, instead, mandates a comprehensive
doctrine: “one which includes an overall theory of value, an ethical theory, an
epistemology, or a controversial metaphysics of the person and society.”44 Callan’s
system allows the state to institutionalize the teaching of a comprehensive conception
of the good which violates the neutrality of the liberal state. Unlike Macedo who
attempts to establish spheres of influence for teaching critical reflection and to

42

Galston, 231.
Eamonn Callan, "Citizenship and Education," Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 7 (2004): 75.
44
Gerald Gaus, Shane D. Courtland, and David Schmidtz, “Liberalism.”
43
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maintain the neutrality of political liberalism,45 Callan denies that the skills needed to
analyze the political realm can be restricted to this domain.46
If Callan is correct that a state-mandated civic education will always result in
the teaching of comprehensive liberalism, then he presents a compelling argument
against his own proposal. At its foundation, liberalism is neutral to comprehensive
conceptions of the good.47 An education system which cannot maintain this neutrality
is not helping to sustain a liberal state; rather, such a system promotes and perpetuates
an illiberal state. As such, Callan’s proposal for a state-mandated education which
actively instills the virtues of liberalism outside of the political sphere cannot be
incorporated in a truly liberal system.
Whatever their other defects, the primary objection to these state-centered
justifications is that they deprioritize liberty. Liberty, whether understood in the
negative or positive sense, is applicable to individuals.48 Justifications which center
around continuity of the state wrongly deemphasize humanity’s freedom in the
natural state. Whether classical liberalism, which defends a state that maintains
individuals’ liberty of non-interference or new liberalism which proposes a state with
more extensive powers to facilitate individuals’ realized liberty, liberal theories begin
with individual liberty and theorize a state which preserves this liberty. Therefore,
educational systems that give priority to concern for the state’s continuity are ruled
out in principle by liberal theories. A liberal state-mandated education system must be
conceived in the same way as the state itself: starting with individuals. Other liberal

45

Macedo, "Liberal Civic Education," 311.
Callan, "Citizenship and Education," 76; 82.
47
For further discussion of the importance of neutrality in a liberal state, please see the introduction.
48
See the introduction for further discussion of this point.
46
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theorists, often in the Rawlsian tradition, offer individualistic justifications for
universal education based upon the potential autonomy and freedom of exit of
children.
Amy Gutmann builds upon the Rawlsian tradition and the idea of primary
goods in providing a child-centered justification for state-mandated universal
education. Gutmann conceives of primary goods as “reflect[ing] a common
understanding within society of what goods rational individuals, ignorant of their
particular interests, would want provided for them within that society.”49 She argues
that primary goods, which are chosen in a situation akin to Rawls’s original position,
determine the extent of allowable paternalism because children do not yet have the
developed reason to determine and express settled goals themselves. Thus, primary
goods are likely to ensure the greatest range of reasonable choices for them as adults
within society.50 Gutmann includes education, healthcare, family, and proper nutrition
among the list of primary goods that properly define a society’s obligation to its
children.51
M. Victoria Costa argues that an educational system must actively engage in
conversations about different conceptions of the good in order to preserve the liberty
of students.52 She contends that this is consistent with Rawls’s political liberalism
when it is applied to the reality of multicultural societies in which minority
communities are often marginalized.53 She notes that while Rawls did not include a

49

Amy Gutmann, "Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument," Philosophy & Public
Affairs (1980): 341.
50
Gutmann, 341.
51
Gutmann, 340.
52
M. Victoria Costa, "Rawlsian Civic Education: Political Not Minimal," Journal of Applied Philosophy
21, no. 1 (2004): 13.
53
Costa, 11.
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detailed plan for an education system in his theory,54 he does argue that civic
education is important so that individuals know their rights and do not remain in
social groups merely because they do not have access to alternatives.55 Thus, in
Costa’s view, the explanation of different conceptions of the good within a liberal
education fulfills the state’s role of protecting a realized right to exit.
Costa creates a false equivalence between freedom of exit and encouragement
to exit. Costa seems to be endorsing a comprehensive conception of the good which
prioritizes autonomy and self-reflection, yet education in this comprehensive ideal
lies outside of the jurisdiction of a political liberal state. Freedom of exit does not
require that one understands the complete list of available options. Rather, the
exercise of this freedom requires that one knows his/her right to two options: this and
not-this. By way of example, if a woman finds herself in an abusive marriage, her exit
rights in a liberal state would include the legal right to exit that marriage; this does
not require an education in the different types and forms of marriage and marriage
alternatives.56 The state’s role is merely to ensure that she is informed of her right of
exit and to guarantee that there will be no legal barriers to her exiting that situation.
As explored by Sigal Ben-Porath, entrance paths after the point at which people
exercise the right of exit are provided by a larger society when it accepts the exiting
member and allows them to engage in “civic life, work, and leisure within dominant
society.”57 These are the conditions of treating people as equal citizens, all of which

54

Costa, 1-2.
Costa, 6-7.
56
Example borrowed from Sigal Ben-Porath, "Exit rights and entrance paths: Accommodating cultural
diversity in a liberal democracy," Perspectives on politics 8, no. 4 (2010): 1030.
57
Ben-Porath, 1026.
55
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are included in the structure of a liberal state. Education in a multitude of ways of life
goes beyond this basic duty of the liberal state and, instead, encourages students to
pursue the ideal of autonomy and to seek out ways of life aside from those in which
they were raised.
Perhaps the most thorough child-centered justification for state-mandated
education is provided in the work of Harry Brighouse. Defending a conception of
positive liberty, Brighouse argues that all adults have an obligation to provide
children with an equal education so that all children have an equal opportunity to
develop into autonomous adults if they choose such an ideal.58According to
Brighouse, to view education as a means to maintaining civil order is “precisely to
treat children (and the adults they will become) not as potentially self-determining
citizens but as subjects of a pre-determined order.”59This is, Brighouse argues,
illiberal to its core. Brighouse dismisses education’s function in perpetuating the state
as of secondary importance. He says, “Education’s status as a public good is
irrelevant: that it is required by justice is what justifies state intervention.”60 Turning
the tables on state-centered theorists, Brighouse presents the argument that state
legitimacy is threatened by an education which primarily aims to perpetuate the state.
Brighouse argues that the legitimacy of a liberal state is dependent upon its
citizens continuously consenting to their government.61 In order for this consent to be
freely given, citizens must be equipped with the skills to evaluate their government.62
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Harry Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000): 15; 2.
Harry Brighouse, "Two Philosophical Errors Concerning School Choice," Oxford Review of Education
23, no. 4 (1997): 508.
60
Harry Brighouse, "Why Should States Fund Schools?," British Journal of Educational Studies 46, no. 2
(1998): 151.
61
Harry Brighouse, "Civic Education and Liberal Legitimacy," Ethics 108, no. 4 (1998): 720.
62
Brighouse, 735.
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He argues that this is achieved through an autonomy-facilitating education that is
distinct from civic education.63 Importantly, this autonomy-facilitating education is
independently justifiable. Brighouse argues,
The fundamental interest each has in living well yields an obligation on all to
provide prospective adults with an instrument for selecting well among ways
of life. Confidence that others have a real opportunity to live lives that are
good for them is only possible if we provide the means to select one.64
Brighouse acknowledges the need for a just liberal state to maintain legitimacy from
the consent of its people, yet he offers a completely independent justification for
state-mandated education which is rooted in the individual liberty of children.
Unlike a strictly civic education which is justifiable by its role in legitimizing
the state, an autonomy-facilitating education is justified completely by society’s duty
to children and, as a byproduct of this process, provides the option for legitimation of
the state. According to Brighouse, this education includes (1) basic academic
curriculum, (2) skills to identify fallacious arguments, (3) explanations of a full range
of ethical views and their reasonings, and (4) training in how people have dealt and
continue to deal with religious and moral disagreements.65 Brighouse argues that his
autonomy-facilitating style of education preserves liberty more thoroughly than an
autonomy-encouraging education. Whereas an autonomy-encouraging education
promotes a certain conception of the good (namely, an autonomous life itself), the
autonomy-facilitating education provides students with the tools to live an
autonomous life if they should choose such a path.66

63

Brighouse, 727.
Brighouse, 731-732 (original emphasis).
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Brighouse, 732-733.
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Brighouse, 734.
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Brighouse attempts to distinguish his own proposal of autonomy-facilitating
education from autonomy-encouraging education by saying that the curriculum
provides knowledge and skills instead of focusing on acquired virtues. However, the
line between these concepts is not as distinct as he hopes.67 If a parent tells a child
that he/she can choose any sport to play but also hands him/her a bat and glove, the
parent has encouraged the child to choose baseball even if it was through actions and
not words. Brighouse admits that in practice autonomy-encouraging and autonomyfacilitating curricula may be indistinguishable.68 Nevertheless, Brighouse maintains
that this subtle nuance is pivotal to maintaining the legitimacy of the state. By ruling
out in principle, even if not clearly in practice, autonomy-encouraging education,
Brighouse retains a student-centered justification for universal education while also
providing an avenue by which this education provides an opportunity for the
legitimization and preservation of the liberal state.
From a historical standpoint, it is also worth noting that in American judicial
precedent, child-centered justifications for universal education are given priority over
state-centered concerns. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court based their ruling
on considerations of whether the state’s interest was satisfied in producing citizens
who would not be a burden on the state while also reflecting a concern for a child’s
personal development and freedom of exit. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Burger argues,
…the State is not concerned with the maintenance of an educational system as
an end in itself; it is rather attempting to nurture and develop the human
potential of its children, whether Amish or non-Amish: to expand their

67
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Brighouse, 733.
Brighouse, 734.
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knowledge, broaden their sensibilities, kindle their imagination, foster a spirit
of free inquiry, and increase their human understanding and tolerance.69
He adds,
A State has a legitimate interest not only in seeking to develop the latent
talents of its children, but also in seeking to prepare them for the lifestyle that
they may later choose, or at least to provide them with an option other than the
life they have led in the past.70
This line of reasoning reflects a concern for the liberal concept of a child’s right of
exit.
These child-centered justifications for a state-mandated education fulfill the
requirements of a liberal political system by prioritizing the liberty of individuals
above the interests of the state. Theorists offering either justification – state-centered
or child-centered – may offer equally robust education systems which allow
significant state intervention in children’s liberty, and in practice, systems built on
either foundation may look incredibly similar. The argument of this section is that
only one of these families of ideas genuinely fulfills the requirements of a liberal
system. I have argued that liberalism rules out in principle those educational
requirements which are proposed to fulfill a state need rather than to protect the
liberty and future liberty of students. The next section explores the standards of
education which a liberal system must maintain following its justification on the basis
of children’s liberty.
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PART II: ADEQUACY VS. EQUALITY STANDARDS FOR EDUCATION
Having examined the proper justifications for a liberal education, this paper
shifts to an analysis of the appropriate contents of a liberal state-mandated education.
Due to the complexity of evaluating the particular curriculum defended by individual
theorists, this paper proposes a simplified framework in which the substance of these
systems can be scrutinized. From a big-picture view, standards of state-mandated
educational achievement can be divided into two groups. The progression of liberal
thought has witnessed a divide between theorists who argue for an adequate level of
universal state-mandated education and those who defend an equal level of universal
state-mandated education for all students.
Beginning with John Stuart Mill, classical liberals often fall into the segment
of theorists who defend an adequacy standard. For Mill, education is a parental duty
that serves as a means to guarantee that children do not become a burden on the state
while also dignifying the individuality of each student in allowing him/her the
opportunity to live an autonomous life.71 The state’s primary educational function is
to hold parents to their duty and to ensure a minimal standard for schools and
teachers.72 Mill opposes a state monopoly on the provision of education; however, he
contends that the state should administer yearly tests on basic subjects in order to
“make the universal acquisition and, what is more, retention of a certain minimum of
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general knowledge virtually compulsory.”73 Thus, while some students will achieve
levels of education above this minimum, the state is justified in compelling all
students to reach this adequacy standard.
Graham Finlay presents a compelling internal objection to Mill’s adequacy
standard. He says that in areas other than linguistics, reading, and math, Mill limits
state-mandated education to merely the reproduction of facts which seemingly
incentivizes behaviors counter to the development of critical thinking skills.74 This
proposal seems to contradict Mill’s goals of dignifying individuals and providing the
tools for an autonomous life. Finlay contends that this oversight is mostly due to
Mill’s “lack of familiarity with the practicalities of education.”75 Mill’s attempt to
limit the standard of compulsory content results in a failure to fulfill his proposed
objectives for a liberal education.
Mill’s On Liberty, in which he presents this conception of a minimal standard,
was originally published in 1859, yet “adequacy” seems to have a different meaning
for varying societies at various times. An education which adequately prepared
students for the 19th century society and workforce of Mill’s day would be woefully
inadequate in the 21st century where educational and employment opportunities are
dependent upon some level of technological literacy. Many theorists who have
defended an adequacy standard since Mill’s time attempt to incorporate mechanisms
by which this standard of adequacy can evolve to meet the needs of children in each
new generation and society. James Tooley offers a market system for this process.76
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However, other contemporary liberal theorists avoid the problems associated with an
evolving standard of adequacy and instead defend a standard of equal education for
all students. Harry Brighouse is a prominent example of such a theorist. The
discourse between James Tooley and Harry Brighouse exemplifies the argument
between liberals on the right and left sides of the liberal spectrum. Tooley proposes
minimal state intervention in his adequacy model of educational provisions while
Brighouse argues for a system of state-involved education focused on equality of
education amongst students. Their disagreement centers around the conflict between
adequacy and equality standards of education.
In Disestablishing the State, James Tooley challenges the idea that the state
must be intimately involved in educational as a matter of necessity.77 In his work
Tooley takes seriously the concerns of writers such as H.L. Mencken who worries
that “the aim of public education is not to spread the enlightenment at all; it is simply
to reduce as many individuals as possible to the same safe level, to breed a standard
citizenry, to put down dissent and originality.”78 Tooley sees his theory as an antidote
to these forms of Foucauldian and Millian fears. He proposes to build a bridge
between those he refers to as “radical ‘deschoolers’” who object to any state
involvement in education and those who do not even question whether government
involvement is required in education.79
Tooley challenges the idea that the state must be robustly involved in
education by building on the work of E.G. West. West develops a “market model” of
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education from a thought experiment which begins with the absence of state
intervention in education and incorporates (1) the stipulation that parents are the
default providers of education and (2) an infancy protection clause which allows for
intervention in families if children are mistreated.80 In Tooley’s proposal, all state
involvement in education is justified on the individualistic level of protecting
children; thus, Tooley’s theory fulfills the initial requirements of a liberal educational
theory defended in Part I.
Extending West’s “market model,” Tooley argues that the state’s involvement
in education should be limited to (1) regulation of a minimum standard of education
through government inspection, (2) funding the education of children from families
who are unable to pay, and (3) coercion of students to participate in education who
would not do so willingly.81 Tooley argues that inspectors can use “rules of thumb”
developed within their own cultures to decide when educational opportunities are
insufficient.82 He contends that a “minimum adequate education could be ensured
without the state being involved in promoting a particular curriculum.”83 Instead of
defending even a very vague curriculum, Tooley contents himself with having “ruled
out, for many readers, what seemed to be the very demanding curricula of education
for democracy, and education for autonomy.”84
In order to strengthen his own case for an adequacy standard for education,
Tooley examines the educational proposals in other liberal political theories and
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argues that an adequacy standard fulfills their requirements as well. Tooley contends
that Rawls’s theory is compatible with West’s market model by arguing for a by-pass
around the difference principle in regard to education.85 Rawls’s difference principle
stipulates that social and economic inequalities are justified “only if the difference in
expectation is to the advantage of the representative man who is worse off.”86 Tooley
says, “…West’s ‘minimum adequate education for all’ satisfies Rawls’ position on
equality of opportunity, with the proviso that instead of seeking the difference
principle, we substitute what Rawls was seeking from it, namely a society with an
adequate guaranteed minimum, or safety net.”87
Tooley’s insistence on equivalence between adequacy and equality of
opportunity is a point of contention for defenders of equality of education such as
Harry Brighouse. Brighouse directly addresses Tooley’s qualms with Rawls in “Why
Should States Fund Schools?” Brighouse rejects Tooley’s assertion that Rawls would
accept an adequate safety net as a substitution for equal opportunity in education.
Brighouse contends, “…since fair equality of opportunity is the key notion, prior to
the difference principle (or any more defensible substitute), Rawls will still require
life-prospects to be as insensitive as possible to family circumstances, even if he
abandons the difference principle.”88
Brighouse defends this claim with two sub-arguments. He concedes to Tooley
that Rawls does allow for inequality of opportunity when such inequalities aid the
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least advantaged.89 However, because inequalities in education will likely not fulfill
this purpose in a single generation, Brighouse concludes that they are not allowed by
Rawls’s theory.90 Additionally, Brighouse rejects such inequalities because children,
the participants in the unequal system, would not understand the justification of such
differences. He explains, “Children cannot be presumed to understand the social
purpose of inequalities, which will appear to place greater value on the lives of
beneficiaries.”91 On these grounds, Brighouse argues that Rawls’s theory supports an
equality standard over an adequacy standard.
Brighouse defends a standard of equality of education among all students as a
matter of justice among equal individuals. Brighouse explains,
Equal opportunity is desirable as a way of implementing a presumption of the
equal moral worth of all persons. This is an individualist criterion: having
society devote less resources to someone’s life for arbitrary reasons is not
much less of an assault on his [or her] moral standing than having society
license such discrimination on other bases.92
He continues to argue that allowing students with wealthier parents to receive more
educational resources than children of low-income families is, in fact, the sort of
arbitrary allocation of society’s resources that denies moral equality between
persons.93 Importantly, Brighouse is defending the position that society as a whole is
responsible for this breach of justice if a child is not provided equal opportunities;
thus, society is collectively responsible for preventing this injustice. Brighouse
argues,
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It is not good enough that people just happen to get what they have a right to:
justice requires institutional guarantees. From the point of view of justice it is
not good enough that an individual’s rights never happen to be violated: it is
essential that we establish institutional forms which assure individuals that
they can make and execute their life plans without fear of rights violations.
The state is an indispensable means for doing this…94
Brighouse argues that justice requires that children’s possibilities of securing societal
goods, such as education or employment, not be limited by the intellect and resources
of their parents (as would be the case in a market model) or their own aptitudes.95 For
Brighouse, inequality is tracked by determining the degree to which inequality in
educational resources correlates to inequalities in family economics, parental
educational attainment, or abilities of the student.96
Tooley denies Brighouse’s equal-opportunity based objection to privatization
of education on three grounds: (1) the impracticality of thinking that the state can ever
provide genuine equality of opportunity, (2) the lack of incentives for parents to
advocate for better schools, and (3) the assertion that equalizing schools will not
equalize education.97 Brighouse admits that complete equality of education may be
impractical, but in answering Tooley’s first and third objections, Brighouse argues
that it matters not only where people are ranked on society’s ladder, but also how
close the rungs are to each other.98 Although a liberal state may never achieve perfect
justice, it maintains a duty to approach this ideal as closely as possible. As a response
to Tooley’s second objection, Brighouse contends that because the intrinsic benefits

94

Brighouse, 162.
Harry Brighouse, "What's Wrong with Privatising Schools?," Journal of Philosophy of Education 38, no.
4 (2004): 617.
96
Brighouse, School Choice, 140.
97
James Tooley, "Why Harry Brighouse Is Nearly Right About the Privatisation of Education," Journal of
Philosophy of Education 37, no. 3 (2003): 436-438.
98
Brighouse, "What's Wrong," 627.
95

30

of education are positive-sum, parents will maintain an incentive to advocate for
better schools in a public system.99 So, even if parents cannot provide their child with
a competitive advantage by campaigning for improvements in her education, they will
advocate for improvements in education which benefit their child and all other
students.
Beyond his initial objections, Tooley isolates what he sees as a paradox in
Brighouse’s argument: “that the more you equalise schooling, the more important
family influence will become.”100 Brighouse offers suggestions to mitigate this
influence, including lengthening the school day and providing assistance to
disadvantaged families to aid in the upbringing of children in the home.101 He
continues to endorse the suggestion that the state adopt zoning policies which actively
disrupt the settlement patterns of class-based neighborhoods.102 However, these
solutions seem to raise more problems for Brighouse’s theory. Without providing a
thorough argument for each of these suggestions, Brighouse leaves himself open to a
prima facie objection that such reforms exceed the justified powers of a liberal state
and violate individuals’ liberty. This lack of support remains a problem to be explored
in his work.
Tooley further argues that Brighouse’s work leaves open the possibility of an
“efficiency argument” in favor of school privatization which says that if privatization
were more efficient economically in providing the same education, then it would be
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preferable to a public system.103 While this may be true, Tooley would need
substantial empirical evidence to prove that this is indeed the case. Brighouse
counters that Tooley can only argue that in some circumstances full privatization is
closer to fulfilling the requirements of justice than the current public system.104
Brighouse provides case studies to argue that this is not evidenced in developing
countries.105 The sporadic reports which favor privatization are, Brighouse argues,
insufficient to mandate the switch to this system.
For the sake of argument, Brighouse assumes Tooley’s position that perhaps
justice only requires an adequate education.106 Brighouse explains, “Justice requires
the adequacy principle be fulfilled so it is not sufficient for it merely to be filled; its
fulfillment has to be guaranteed.”107 Even if Tooley is able to provide a defense for
the claim that justice requires an adequacy standard, which Brighouse notes is lacking
in Tooley’s work, Tooley’s market system does not guarantee that the standards of
justice are fulfilled.108 At best, the standard of adequacy in education only satisfies
the requirements of justice by chance. Thus, justice between equal citizen in a liberal
system requires a standard of equality as opposed to a standard of adequacy.
After examining the debate between adequacy and equality standard for a
liberal education, I conclude that for a liberal state to fulfill its duty in protecting the
liberty and political equality of its citizens, liberal education systems must adopt
standards of equality. Adequacy standards may prove sufficient for preventing
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children from becoming a burden on the state, but as I argued in Part I, liberal
institutions must be justified on the individual level of respecting citizen’s current and
future liberty. Equality standards, as presented by Brighouse, are faithful to the childcentered justification in their demand that all students be treated as equally deserving
of the opportunity to frame and pursue their own conceptions of the good within the
liberal state.

33

PART III: PARENTAL RIGHTS AND FAMILY VALUE
A perennial objection that liberals face when defending state-mandated
universal education, particularly of the individual equality-based variety defended in
Parts I and II, is that such a system violates parental rights and undermines the value
of the family. Because children are not yet fully rational beings who are capable of
giving consent, they must be treated paternalistically.109 The question becomes who
will exercise this paternalistic power. For many theorists, the obvious and complete
answer is the child’s biological parents.110 However, because of the priority of a
child’s liberty and future liberty in any liberal theory, parental rights to control over
their children’s education are disputable.
In particular, critics of an equal state-mandated education worry that this
system undermines the right of parents to raise their children within their own
religious lifestyle. Education could be detrimental to these lifestyles by (1) violating a
religious doctrine which prohibits education or (2) resulting in the voluntary
departure of children from the religious way of life after receiving an education.
Gutmann confronts this first concern and explains, “We rank children’s rights to
education above their rights to religious freedom since we believe that this restriction
of their present liberty is necessary to create the conditions for future enjoyments of
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religious and other freedoms.”111 Thus, while children may mature into adults who
adhere to a religious doctrine which advocates the immorality of education, this
religious freedom can be limited in childhood in order to guarantee that this religious
view and lifestyle is chosen freely as an exercise of liberty and not as a function of
indoctrination. This argument is analogous to that provided by John Stuart Mill in his
explanation of why a liberal state can prohibit voluntary slavery contracts. In Chapter
V of On Liberty, Mill argues that a state can restrict such contracts on the grounds
that this singular act precludes a lifetime of exercising one’s liberty.112 He says, “The
principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free.”113
Gutmann’s argument follows suit. Religious freedom cannot be used to deny a child
access to an education which allows him/her to understand and exercise liberty in the
first place.
A challenge of this religious variety is raised and dismissed in Mozert v.
Hawkins. Mozert, the parents of students in the Hawkins School District, “claimed
interference with their parental right to control the religious and moral upbringing of
their children”114 because the school district utilized reading materials which, the
parents alleged, featured topics such as feminism and socialism.115 The court ruled
that the students could be compelled to use these textbooks because they were not
coerced to accept the ideas in the texts.116 The books were merely used to develop
citizens through the cultivation of critical thinking skills in areas such as morality and
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social issues.117 Furthermore, the fact remains that the Mozerts are free to teach their
children their chosen side of these issues outside of school hours.
Even classical liberals who defend negative liberty, such as John Stuart Mill,
are perhaps not as deferential to parental rights over a child’s education as may be
supposed. Alan Ryan, a Mill scholar, contends that Mill generally “brushes off the
common view that parents had a natural right to determine the content of their
children’s teaching.”118 Mill repudiates parents’ conception of their rights over their
children. He says,
It is in the case of children that misapplied notions of liberty are a real
obstacle to the fulfillment by the State of its duties. One would almost think
that a man’s children were supposed to be literally, and not metaphorically, a
part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with
his absolute and exclusive control over them, more jealous than of almost any
interference with his own freedom of action: so much less do the generality of
mankind value liberty than power.119
Thus, even with the acceptance of the necessity of paternalistic influences on
children, parental rights over their children are in no way as absolute as rights over
oneself. Mill denies that parents should be the final authorities over the content of
their children’s education for the simple fact that “[t]he uncultivated cannot be
competent judges of cultivation.”120 Mill contends that average parents have an
insufficient understanding of the education that students require.121
Amy Gutmann argues that a parent’s negative liberty to live their life as they
see fit cannot be extended to rights over other people, including their children.122 She
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says, “We have no a priori reason to favor one paternalistic agent over another.”123As
opposed to assuming the role for biological parents, Gutmann maintains that
paternalistic rights should be given to the agent that is most able to satisfy the
interests of the child.124 In her conception, parents are given paternalistic rights on the
condition that they satisfy these needs which “leaves open, at least in theory, the
possibility that parents will not be the appropriate paternalistic agents for their own
children.”125 While this argument may appear upon first glance to be offensive to
society’s conception of the nuclear family, this idea aligns with our common
conception of guardianship which encompasses parental rights while being
transferable to other family members, adopted family members, and even the state.
Harry Brighouse’s conception of parental rights complements that of
Gutmann by expanding on the idea that these parental rights are derivative while a
child’s liberty and right to an education are fundamental. Brighouse argues because
parental rights are rights over another human being, to affirm the priority of parental
rights in education is to ignore that children are also individuals.126 Parental rights are
not fundamental; they are derivative rights based upon the benefit to children for
development.127 Thus, fundamental rights of the child can trump derivative rights of
the parents.128
In his critique of Brighouse, James Tooley commits Brighouse to the idea that
authorities can prescribe paths of action for individuals better than the individuals
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themselves.129 He argues that a centralized state-mandated education, such as the
autonomy-facilitating education proposed by Brighouse, neglects to take into account
the variety of experiences and intellectual abilities which would be accommodated
more efficiently if parents and local authorities maintained control over education.130
In effect, Tooley accuses Brighouse of unacceptable paternalism in regard to the
students’ parents. In Tooley’s view, the state is unjustly exercising its power and
violating parents’ liberty by removing these choices from the parents’ purview.
Tooley’s objection of unwarranted paternalism both misses Brighouse’s point
on parental rights as derivative rights and blurs the division between allowing experts
to shape policy and accepting unrestricted orders from a dictator. The individuals
affected by educational policy are not the ones who will make the decisions in any
suggested theory. The consensus is that children are insufficiently developed to be
entrusted with these decisions themselves. Thus, paternalism is inevitable in regard to
education.
As was recognized in Part II, Brighouse’s theory is susceptible to an argument
from efficiency. For Brighouse, parental rights are merely a pragmatic social
construct. Brighouse argues that parental rights are merely a convenient vehicle for
fulfilling all adults’ obligation to children.131 He argues that while all adults have an
obligation to provide children with the opportunity to become autonomous
individuals, most adults are not in a position to fulfill this obligation.132 Thus, out of
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convenience, this duty falls to parents.133 However, if the child’s best interests are
served by dividing this duty with other adults, then that is the option that should be
chosen.134 If parental decisions were found to produce a consistent pattern of superior
outcomes and levels of equality for children, Brighouse would have to defer to the
parents over supposed experts. However, until this state of affairs obtains (which
Brighouse appears to see as an unlikely event), paternalistic decisions are entrusted to
the entity which can best satisfy the educational needs of students: the state’s experts.
Thus, reliance on educational professionals is not unqualified in the way that one
would expect from a blindly paternalistic state. Additionally, as argued in Part II, the
liberal state must guarantee that all students receive an equal standard of education. I
think that there is a prima facie case for assuming that a decentralized system of
nearly complete parental control over education, which Tooley suggests, would be
unable to more effectively fill this requirement than a smaller group of state experts.
Unsurprisingly, leftist liberal theories are susceptible to the criticism that they
not only violate parental rights but are also generally unfriendly to the family as an
institution. In anticipation of this concern, Brighouse incorporates a caveat into his
principle of transferability of parental rights. His full position reads,
If children’s interests in general are best served by a division of authority
between parents and some other agency, then that division is to be preferred
over giving parents exclusive authority, as long as this division does not
infringe the fundamental rights of parents to intimate relations with their
children.135
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Elsewhere, Brighouse directly confronts the concern that his suggestions are
antagonistic to the value of the family. To address this issue, he posits an area of
affairs that is free from state interference by the mere fact that such matters are
essential to the value of families and that family value is “prior to the value of
educational equality.”136 He provides two specific examples of activities which
occupy this intrusion-free space: the right to transmit one’s passion to one’s children
and the right to share one’s life with one’s children.137 These restrictions on state
action imply that when children are not at school, parents will be able to teach their
own religious doctrines and/or comprehensive conceptions of the good to their
children without fear of the state’s obtrusion. Brighouse contends that his theory
respects the value of the family because there is no reason to think that the possible
restrictions imposed by his theory (such as prohibiting private schooling) will affect
the loving relationships between parents and children that exists during family
hours.138
I offer a supplementary argument to bolster Brighouse’s claim. The family
value which opponents of an equality standard for state-mandated education purport
to defend is entirely unique to the family unit. If family value is unique to the familial
institution, such value cannot be transferred to another entity. Familial rights exist in
this sphere of the family’s nontransferable value, i.e. value that cannot be found in
any other institution. Brighouse’s two suggestions of sharing one’s life with one’s
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children and the ability to share one’s passions with one’s children139 are included
within the category of familial goods with nontransferable value. Complete parental
rights over education would allow parents who are “good choosers” to provide their
children with a positional economic good of an education above the level of equality
with fellow students. However, positional economic goods can be derived from
multiple entities outside of the family, such as through volunteer experience within
the community. Thus, positional economic goods are not part of the unique value of
the family. It follows that limitations on parents’ ability to choose a superior
education that provides these positional economic goods do not affect the unique
value of the family itself. Therefore, equalizing education does not diminish the value
of the family.
Many liberal theorists feel compelled to defend their theories against the
accusation that their educational proposals negatively affect the familial institution
either by violating parental rights or undermining the institution’s value. However, a
closer analysis of these concerns and liberals’ responses renders these objections
ineffective. By limiting parents’ ability to provide their children with a higher level of
education than the children’s peers, liberal theorists neither infringe on parental rights
nor diminish the value of the family.
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PART IV: MINIMIZED PLURALISM AND LIBERAL EDUCATION
Other common objections to a state-mandated education rest on the concern
that such a system renders some ways of ways life inaccessible. By requiring all
children to receive an education, liberals are removing, in effect even if without
intention, some ways of life from the realm of citizens’ choices. The opponent of a
universal mandatory education argues that this violates liberal tenets and minimizes
the societal pluralism which liberals are supposed to protect.
Liberals who advocate for a state-mandated education defend themselves from
such objections through various arguments for the claim that the prioritization of
individual liberty is not directly translatable into a maximization of pluralism. In On
Liberty, Mill argues that some ways of life which are entirely antithetical to liberty
will necessarily be restricted by a liberal society. One such lifestyle is that of
voluntary slavery.140 Mill maintains that a liberal society will not permit this lifestyle
and explains that “[t]he principles of freedom cannot require that he should be free
not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom.”141 In Mill’s
theory, one cannot pursue a life of slavery even voluntarily; this conception of the
good is ruled out in principle by a liberal state. Liberalism is justified in restraining
the pursuit of such lifestyles because it does so for the preservation of liberty.
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Mill advocates for the protection of pluralism as a means not as an end with
intrinsic value. This diversity of lifestyles is an experiment for determining which
conceptions of the good are worth pursuing.142 As people are allowed to pursue
different lifestyles and plans for creating a good life, individuals within society are
able to witness the results and determine for themselves which lifestyles are indeed
worth pursuing. These experiments in different ways of life “would promote and
destroy pluralism at the same time.”143 As people move between communities and
start new practices in pursuit of their conceptions of the good, those lifestyles which
fail to gain new adherents will eventually cease to be a part of society. Pluralism has
only instrumental value in this sense.
Alan Ryan, in his article “Mill in a Liberal Landscape,” applies these ideas to
the landmark Supreme Court case Wisconsin v. Yoder. Ryan claims that in regard to
Yoder, a liberal could argue based on a child’s freedom of exit that “[i]f the Amish
cannot preserve their hold over their young people without preventing them from
learning whatever an American high school might teach them after the age of
fourteen, they have no business trying to preserve their way of life at all.”144 A liberal
society has no obligation to maintain the highest possible level of diversity in
lifestyles; rather, the liberal state retains a duty to preserve the liberty of individuals
in its citizenry.
Fear of a child’s exit or the diminution of a community’s population by the
free choices of its next generation cannot be used to limit a child’s access to
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education. This would prioritize liberty of groups over the liberty of individuals in a
way which violates the fundamentals of liberalism. In the article “Fairness to
Goodness,” John Rawls presents the argument that fairness to individuals takes
priority above fairness to ways of life.145 He explains,
[I]ndividuals are not identified with their actual or possible plans but are
viewed rather as beings that have a capacity for forming, adopting, and
changing these plans, should they be so moved; and who give priority to
preserving their liberty in these matters.146
This liberty of individuals to construct and pursue their own conceptions of the good
must be preserved by the liberal state even at the expense of diminished membership
in some communities. Group rights are derived from the liberty and free consent of its
members. So, the fundamental liberty and right of exit of a groups’ members cannot
be limited merely to preserve a unit with only derivative rights. As argued in Parts I
and II, education is a matter of fundamental liberty for children; thus, the interests of
groups cannot be leveraged to abridge this liberty.
Some liberal theorists argue that diversity of lifestyles is also necessarily
limited by the need to teach students the political values of mutual respect or
toleration in a truly liberal state. In order for the state to protect the liberty of its
whole population, citizens must be allowed equal respect and participation in the
political sphere. This requirement necessitates that comprehensive conceptions of the
good which reject this political equality, and their corresponding lifestyles, will be
made unavailable by the teaching of this political value. John Rawls argues that
although the liberal state includes a reasonable diversity of lifestyles, the liberal state
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maintains no obligation to preserve “unreasonable” comprehensive conceptions of the
good. He says,
Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of
reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of
the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a
constitutional democratic regime. Political liberalism also supposes that a
reasonable comprehensive doctrine does not reject the essentials of a
democratic regime.147
However, liberal theorists must not be overzealous in incorporating these ideals in an
education system. While students must be taught the political values of respect and
equality of persons, the teaching of these ideals as comprehensive values outside of
the political sphere violates the neutrality of the liberal state by actively discouraging
illiberal lifestyles. Thus, the teaching of values which may limit societal pluralism
must be justified on the grounds of protecting individuals’ liberty and political
equality.
In “Civic Education and Social Diversity,” Amy Gutmann argues that a liberal
education must teach students the political value of mutual respect. Initially, she
claims that diversity is limited because liberalism produces a society in which citizens
“respect each other’s basic rights and opportunities.”148 Later in the same article,
Gutmann expands this conception of mere tolerance for the sake of civic equality to
the more expansive requirement of mutual respect.149 She argues that the concept of
simple tolerance of equality would result in a “live and let live” mentality that is
irreconcilable with true equality of opportunity.150 Using the example of
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nondiscrimination in hiring practices, Gutmann contends that tolerance will produce
discrimination between different societal groups which usually avoid interacting with
one another while mutual respect (a level of positive regard) amongst all citizens
would mitigate this problem. Thus, she argues that mutual respect is a necessary
value in the political sphere of society.151
Gutmann preempts possible objections to this idea by clarifying that mutual
respect is only taught to students as compulsory in the political sphere. Gutmann
explains,
Political liberalism does not value mutual respect as a nonpolitical virtue–part
of what living an open-minded or autonomous life entails–but it still embraces
mutual respect as an essential political virtue because it is a practical
prerequisite for nondiscriminatory employment practices.152
Tolerance would require merely that different groups coexist within society even if in
isolation from one another; however, Gutmann sees mutual respect as guaranteeing
that these groups can interact equally and peacefully as is required in the political
sphere of a liberal state.
The teaching of mutual respect necessarily precludes the existence of groups
in society which hold dogmatic biases against other groups. Gutmann accepts that
some ways of life are irreconcilable with liberal political systems. She elaborates,
“Liberal democracy is not committed to enabling all valuable ways of life to flourish,
no matter what. The dilemma of diversity arises because the value of a conscientious
way of life apparently comes into conflict with the terms of fair cooperation among
citizens.”153 According to Gutmann, ways of life which deny equality between
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persons are suppressed in a liberal state which guarantees such equality in the
political sphere. This restriction of pluralism is inevitable for a liberal state.
Eamonn Callan presents another view on these concerns and claims that
Rawls’s fair terms of cooperation require mutual understanding between citizens.154
He says that in order to cooperate politically, citizens must be able to see the world
from the perspective of other citizens. Callan argues, “Because I must seek to
cooperate with others politically on terms that make sense from their moral
perspective as well as my own, I must be ready to enter that perspective imaginatively
so as to grasp its distinctive content.”155 This entails a “positive regard for each
others’ extra-political beliefs and practices.”156 Even more extensively than
Gutmann’s suggestion of mutual respect, Callan’s educational system will actively
discourage many ways of life which reject this style of moral equivalence between
beliefs.
To draw this conclusion from Rawls’s standard of fair terms of cooperation is
a mischaracterization. One must be able to agree to disagree and accept the results of
a fair political process in Rawls’s system; however, one does not have to fully
understand or interact with the other’s side in order to reach this agreement. Going
beyond the teaching of the political value of tolerance and respect, the teaching of
mutual understanding intentionally discourages students’ free choice of dogmatic or
illiberal comprehensive conceptions of the good. However, the liberal state must
maintain neutrality towards all reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good,
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including illiberal conceptions. Thus, a liberal state cannot mandate the teaching of
mutual understanding.
Macedo rejects Callan’s conception of mutual understanding which requires
appreciation of other beliefs and, instead, argues that civic respect in the political
sphere should be included in a liberal education. Civic respect acknowledges that
some comprehensive views are irreconcilable with one another but also contends that
these disagreements do not necessarily hamper political cooperation, shared political
principles, or respect between equals.157 The respect required for a liberal political
system does not necessitate that citizens exhibit the same respect in social
interactions. Macedo reasons that an education can include critical thinking about the
political process while also allowing for religious differences and the dogmatic way
these views may be held.158 Macedo denies the implied inevitability in Callan’s
system that such respect cannot be confined to only the political realm, and in doing
so, Macedo provides the space for a greater degree of societal diversity in his theory,
including illiberal comprehensive conceptions of the good.
Although liberals must limit some aspects of pluralism in their proposed
systems, my analysis concludes that most common objections to state-mandated
education based upon this restricted pluralism are benign. The preservation of
children’s liberty and interest in education cannot be sacrificed in order to further the
derivative interests of societal factions. Because a liberal state must maintain and
propagate a system of political equality between citizens, additional restrictions on
pluralism will result from an education in toleration or respect. Nevertheless, all such
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limitations must be justified by arguments based on the fundamental goal of the
liberal state: preservation of citizens’ liberty to construct and pursue their own
conceptions of the good.
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CONCLUSION
Liberal theorists across the ideological spectrum have debated about
justifications and standards of state-mandated education in a truly liberal political
system. However, these discussions have largely neglected to separate these
arguments into distinct families for individual analysis. Part I concluded that only
child-centered justifications of a state-mandated education uphold the liberal standard
of prioritization of liberty while state-centered justifications neglect this requirement.
Part II defends the positions that these child-centered justifications lead to an equality
standard for education in a liberal state. Through the examination of the discourse
between James Tooley and Harry Brighouse, the adequacy standard is rejected as
failing to treat children as prospective full equals in society with lives to lead.
Parts III and IV argue that two perennial objects to equal state-mandated
education in a liberal state based on parental rights and the preservation of diversity
do not present a significant obstacle for liberal theorists. Objections to a statemandated education which are rooted in the supremacy of parental rights are
dismissible due to their prioritization of parents’ derivative rights over the
fundamental liberty of children, while objections based on familial value fail to show
that state-mandated education in any way affects this unique value. Furthermore,
concerns that liberal theorists neglect liberal foundations in allowing the restriction of
pluralism in society are shown to be based on a misunderstanding of the role of
diversity in a liberal state. Pluralism in a liberal society is a means by which citizens
50

can pursue their own individual conceptions of the good. However, their ability to
form and pursue this conception is prior in importance to this diversity in society.
Although an education which includes liberal political values renders some lifestyles
unavailable, these restrictions on pluralism are justified by the liberal state’s duty of
preserving citizens’ equal respect in the political sphere as well as their liberty to
pursue their own conceptions of the good.
Harry Brighouse’s theory, as presented in School Choice and Social Justice,
aligns with both the liberal child-centered justification and equality standard of
education while providing adequate answers to both perennial objections presented in
this work. Within his own theory, Brighouse admits to a substantial problem with
translating this equality standard into a reality. In particular, Brighouse claims to
possess only a partial answer to the “bottomless pit problem” for equal education: a
situation in which the education of naturally gifted students would be neglected
completely in order to dedicate resources to the segment of the student populace who
may never be able to achieve the success of the highest achieving students.159
Additionally, Brighouse’s attempts to reconcile an equality standard with real world
constraints forces him to employ the idea of deserved inequality, yet this concept is
neither sufficiently explained nor justified.160 To build upon the arguments in this
paper, further work is needed to address these complications in Brighouse’s theory.
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